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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020769-CA

v.
JOSEPH ANTHONY SLATTERY,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony (R. 1-3). This court
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2) (e) (2002) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Can defendant prevail on his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel where he enjoyed no better probability of a
different trial outcome even if his counsel had objected to the
testimony defendant asserts should not have been admitted?
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 1 20, 984 P.2d 376
(citations omitted).

If it is easier to do so, the reviewing

court may dispose of such a claim on the ground of no prejudice.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Ineffective assistance presents a

question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying trial.
See State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996)(citing State v.
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)).
2.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's

verdict, was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict?
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant
committed the crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is dispositive
in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault,
a third degree felony (R. 3-5).

He was tried by a jury and

convicted as charged (R. 102, 138-39).

The trial court sentenced

him to a suspended term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State
Prison and a $5000 fine.

The court also ordered him to serve 6C

days in the Salt Lake County jail and 24 months on probation, pay
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a $7 50 f i n e , and comply w i t h a v a r i e t y of c o n d i t i o n s
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S T A T E M E N T OF THE FACTS 1
R a c h e l V e l a s q u e z , the v i c t i m in th i s :ase, c l o c k e d • :>ut from
her job as a W a l m a r t c a s h i e r at: e x a c t l y m i d n i g h t oi i S a t u r d a y ,
O c t o b e r 13 t h of 2 001
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She w a l k e d out the front
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over to her car, whi i:h was p a r k e d "pretty m u c h by itself, "
a r e a n e a r 11 I = :j a r d e r I :: e n t e i: 11: I a 1: * a s i i : t:
R. 1 3 8 : 7 2 - 73,

75) .
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She got: :i i i her car, c l o s e d the d o o r ,

fastened her s e a t b e l t , and i n s e r t e d the key in the i g n i t i o n
at: ; 5, 1 26) .

-

• .
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S t a n d i n g t h e r e was a m a n with d a r k , s h o u l d e r - l e n g t h
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(Id. at 7 5- 7 6) .

He said he n e e d e d he1p j u m p -

s t a r t i n g his t r u c k ( Id. at 7 8 ) ,

Rachel told him she did not have

any c a b l e s ; he r e s p o n d e d that he « ±1/ ::i ( I - i. ) ,

After suggesting

that he try n e a r b y b u s i n e s s e s for h e l p , R a c h e l r e a l i z e d from, his
b r e a 11: i 11 ta t 1:1: I = • i i ta i I

a s :i rl 11 I k ( I d. a t: ! ' 9)

SI I• = t :i : :i a ::! 1: • : :: ] :) s e

the car d o o r , t e l l i n g the m a n she could ncvt h e l p , but she was
u n a b l e to do so b e c a u s e he was b l o c k i n g the d o o r w a y

1

( Id ) .

The facts are r e c i t e d in the ligl it m o s t f a v o r a b l e to U le
jury v e r d i c t . See State v. H e a p s , 2000 UT 5, 1 2 , 999 P.2d 565.
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Insisting that she help him, the man moved closer.

He then

stabbed her with an unidentified object on the left side, below
her armpit (Id. at 79-80).

When Rachel began screaming and

honking her car horn, the man walked away and back to his truck;
however, he seemed in no rush to get away (Id. at 82-83).
Rachel immediately drove over to where an acquaintance,
Scott Molis, was eating a snack in his Blazer, which was towing a
12-foot trailer loaded with power washing equipment (Id. at 74,
82, 233-35, 252).

She told Scott what had happened, pointed out

her assailant standing by his truck in the parking lot, and then
realized she was bleeding (Id. at 83-84, 236).

Scott sent the

frantic young woman inside to call the police and told her he
would go after the man, whom he described as less-than-average in
height and build, with dark hair and a scruffy beard, driving a
'68-'72 powder blue Chevy or Ford truck (IdL. at 84, 161, 235,
238, 269).

Encumbered by the load he was pulling, Scott reached

within 20 feet of the man's truck, but was ultimately unable to
catch him as he drove out of the parking lot (Id. at 240-42). 2
Rachel Velasquez testified at trial.

Conceding that the

light in the Walmart parking lot was not good, she openly
admitted that she was unable, on two different occasions, to
select defendant's picture from police photo arrays (R. 138: 75,
2

The police later presented Scott with a photo array, but
he was unable to identify defendant. Nonetheless, he testified
at trial that defendant closely resembled the person in the truck
he had chased (R. 138: 243-44; R. 139: 383).
-4-

95, 138, 142, 171). She further conceded that the first time she
saw defendant up close, which was at the preliminary hearing, she
was only 50% sure that he was her assailant (Id. at 143, 153).
She also testified that, after the preliminary hearing, an
officer took her to see if she could recognize her assailant's
truck.

She immediately noticed that the rear license plate of

the vehicle the officer showed her was mounted off-center, just
as she had remembered it from the night of the assault (R. 139:
579, 582; R. 138: 91, 163). The color was also the same (R. 138
at 179). Rachel also realized at that time that she had a slip
of paper in her pocket with the license plate number written on
it (Id. at 101) .

Relying on that number, as well as her

recollection of the truck's color and off-center license plate,
she identified the truck as the one her assailant was driving (R.
139: 587-88) .
Finally, in her rebuttal testimony, Rachel stated that she
had never heard defendant's voice until the second day of trial,
when he took the stand as a witness.

She stated: "As soon as I

heard [defendant's voice], I started shaking, as if I was - that
night, what happened.
shaking inside.

I was totally fearful, like I'm still

It's like my body recognized it" (Id. at 579).

Rachel experienced this fearful reaction "when [defendant] first
started talking earlier" (Id.).

Asked how sure she was of the

voice identification, she replied, "I am sure.

I had to walk out

of the room because I almost started crying" (Id. at 580). On

-5-

cross examination, Rachel told defense counsel, "I didn't even
think of [feeling fearful towards defendant] until I heard his
voice" (l£L. at 581) .
•

*

•

A teenager named Jay was leaving Walmart with his mother
just after midnight, when he heard a girl screaming and realized
"that's not a girl screaming for fun" (R. 138: 191). Jay saw a
man leaning into a car, making forward thrusting motions with his
fist, while the girl tried to get him off of her (Id. at 191-93).
Jay's mother directed him not to get involved, so Jay stood and
watched to see what would happen (Id. at 194). As the man walked
toward his truck, he came to within 20 feet of where Jay and his
mother were standing.

Jay testified that the man was "wobbly"

and appeared intoxicated, had a beard and very long dark hair,
wore a plaid shirt, levis, boots, and a baseball cap, and was
driving a full-size blue Ford or Chevy truck (Id. at 195-96, 209,
213-14).

Jay memorized the truck's license plate number, 378

KRZ, and wrote it down soon afterwards, when he returned to the
Walmart to talk to the police (Id. at 196, 226). Jay testified
at trial that defendant looked like the man who drove off in the
blue truck (Id. at 202).
•

•

•

Thirty-two minutes after Rachel Velasquez clocked out of
Walmart, Officer Scott Daniels reported a hit and run accident at
the Paper Moon bar, located at 3423 South State Street in Salt
-6-

Lake City3 (IdL. at 279, 281). He stopped the vehicle, an older
model blue Chevy truck with license number 378 KRZ (Id. at 28586).

Defendant, the intoxicated driver of the truck, had backed

into another vehicle, and then tried to leave the scene (Id. at
279, 306). The police cited defendant for DUI and impounded his
truck (Id. at 306). Officer Daniels, when asked, did not
remember anything about what defendant was wearing that night
(Id. at 287).
Defendant denied he was at Walmart around midnight, but
conceded he had so much to drink that night that he could not
walk and was too drunk to drive.

He also admitted that he had

"tapped" a car in the Paper Moon parking lot (R. 139 at 514, 522,
536).

He insisted that he had been wearing a distinctive court

jester hat all evening, which he referred to as a "king fool hat"
(Id. at 523, 535; see Def. Ex. #s 15 & 17). He also testified
that he was the only person in possession of his truck and truck
keys that night (R. 139: 340, 548).

Defendant's friend and

drinking buddy, David Gouge, corroborated defendant's alibi in
all relevant detail.

See id. at 407-75.

After 40 minutes of deliberation, the jury convicted
defendant, as charged, of aggravated assault (R. 102, R. 140: 6).
3

A private investigator for the defense testified that
driving from Walmart to the Paper Moon at midnight took him
between 17 and 18 minutes, depending on his choice of route (R.
139 at 489-91). An investigator for the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office testified that in mid-afternoon the same trip
took him between 12 and 13 minutes, depending on the route (Id.
at 346).
-7-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney did not object to the victim's
identification of him at trial.

This claim fails both on the

deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the relevant
analysis.

The testimony to which defendant objects - a visual

in-court identification - was, when considered in context,
equivocal at best.

In any event, had it been excluded, defendant

was still likely to have been convicted.

The victim's equivocal

identification was simply not the linchpin of the case.

The most

persuasive evidence before the jury was the teenager's
identification of defendant's license plate number at the scene
of the crime, combined with defendant's own admission that he was
the only person in possession of his truck or truck keys on the
night of the assault.

Defendant thus suffered no prejudice from

the deficient performance he alleges.
Second, the evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction.

Defendant's argument to the contrary ignores the

jury's role in determining the credibility of the witnesses,
incorrectly presuming that the jury had to believe the evidence
mos: favorable to him rather than that presented by the State.
When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, it was plainly sufficient to support the
conviction.

-8-

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FAILS BECAUSE
HE HAD NO BETTER PROBABILITY OF A
DIFFERENT TRIAL RESULT EVEN IF THE
JURY HAD NOT CONSIDERED THE
TESTIMONY TO WHICH HE OBJECTS
Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by
failing to object to Rachel Velasquez's statement that she was
"sure" defendant was her assailant.

He contends that, absent

this constitutionally unreliable in-court identification by the
victim, which he contends provided the pivotal link between him
and the crime, the jury would not have convicted him.

See Br. of

Aplt. at 28-31.
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails
both on the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the
analysis.

However, the law is well-settled that "[i]f it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be
followed."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697; accord

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994).

That is the

case here,4
4

In proceeding directly to the prejudice prong, the State
does not concede that trial counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient. Tthe victim's visual identification
testimony ranged from two photo-array non-identifications prior
to trial to an "50% sure" identification at the preliminary
hearing to a "sure" identification at trial. This testimony,
considered as a whole, was plainly equivocal and could as easily
have played in favor of the defense as the prosecution. Because
-9-

To show prejudice, defendant must carry the burden of
demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have
been convicted had his counsel objected to the allegedly harmful
testimony.
1996).

See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah

Defendant has not met this burden.

The undisputed evidence at trial established that the
license plate of the blue truck driven by Rachel Velasquez's
assailant was 378 KRC (R. 138: 196). The teenager who saw the
license number gave it to the police on the scene and also wrote
it down on a piece of paper that Rachel later found in her pocket
(Id. at 101).

Both the victim and the teenager testified that

the man who assaulted Rachel appeared to be intoxicated (Id. at
79, 195, 198). Less than half an hour after the assault, an
officer stopped a blue truck, license number 378 KRC, leaving the
scene of an accident (Id. at 286).
intoxicated (Id. at 283, 306).

Defendant, the driver, was

Defendant himself unequivocally

maintained that he was the only person in possession of his truck
and his truck keys on the night of the assault (R. 139: 548).
In light of this evidence, Rachel's testimony linking
defendant to the crime was not the linchpin of the case.

Indeed,

the testimony could have been interpreted to support defendant's
contention that he was not the assailant, defense counsel did not
perform deficiently by not objecting to it. See State v.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993) ("If a rational basis
for counsel's performance can be articulated[, this Court will
assume counsel acted competently"). In any event, the jury was
given a cautionary instruction to guide its consideration of the
testimony (R. 81-83).
-10-

wholly apart from the victim's testimony about defendant's
identity, the evidence before the jury compelled a finding of
guilt.

For this reason, defendant's ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails.
POINT TWO
WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT,
WITH DEFERENCE TO THE JURY'S
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS, THE
EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Defendant argues at length that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he was the individual who attacked
Rachel Velasquez in the Walmart parking lot.
31-45.5

See Br. of Aplt. at

For this argument, defendant relies primarily on the

victim's inability to identify him from two police photo arrays
and on inconsistencies between her testimony and that of other
witnesses.

See id. at 23.

Defendant argues that the victim's

weak testimony and the testimony of defendant's alibi witness
together created a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator.
Id. at 43-45.

Defendant also asserts, without citing any legal

authority, that the teenager's unequivocal license plate

5

Defendant also briefly argues that because he could not
have been at Walmart at the time the attack occurred, his trial
counsel performed deficiently by failing to move for a directed
verdict, and the trial court committed plain error by not sua
sponte refusing to submit the matter to the jury. See Br. of
Aplt. at 45-47. Because these arguments turn on the sufficiency
of the evidence, they need not be analyzed apart from that issue
-11-

identification made "was insufficient to link [defendant] to the
crime."

Id. at 41.

An appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence following a criminal conviction is limited.
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

State

A reviewing court

will reverse a criminal conviction on insufficiency grounds only
when the evidence is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the
crime.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983),

superceded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
1987).

However, "[w]here there is any evidence, including

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a
reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the
verdict."

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

Defendant's argument fails because he does not recognize the
role of credibility in the jury's assessment of the evidence.
The law is well-settled that "[d]eterminations of witness
credibility are left to the jury.

The jury is free to believe or

disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony."

State v.

Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas,
793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 1990).

And,

[wjhen the evidence presented is conflicting
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the
-12-

evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).

Furthermore, minor inconsistencies or contradictions

in a witness's testimony will not warrant reversal based on
insufficient evidence.

State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah

App. 1998).
In this case, defendant's insufficiency argument turns on
three contentions.

First, he argues that Rachel Velasquez's

testimony was so inconclusive as to necessarily create a
reasonable doubt that he was the assailant.
40-41.

See Br. of Aplt. at

It is true that Rachel admitted that she was unable to

identify defendant from the two police photo arrays (R. 138: 95,
138, 142, 171). She also admitted that because she was in shock
at the time of the attack, she could have been mistaken when she
told the police that her assailant's truck had a solid tailgate
(R. 139: 589).6

To this point, Rachel's testimony provides

little evidence on which a jury could convict defendant.
On the second day of trial, however, Rachel Velasquez heard
defendant speak out loud for the first time (Id. at 578). She
reacted strongly to the sound of his voice, testifying that she
had an unexpected visceral reaction to it (Id.).

Based on an

immediate recognition of defendant's voice, Rachel then for the

6

Other witnesses testified that the truck had a black mesh
cargo net installed where the tailgate would normally be. See R.
139: 439, 479-80, 525).
-13-

first time unequivocally identified defendant as her attacker7
(Id. at 578, 581) .
Plainly, the jury exercised its prerogative in weighing the
credibility of all of Rachel's testimony. State v. Brown, 948
P.2d 337, 343-44 (Utah 1997).

The jury was free to believe

Rachel's inability to recognize defendant visually, based on the
poor light in the parking lot and the trauma of the event, as
well as her unequivocal recognition of defendant's voice when he
finally spoke up at trial.
Second, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient
to convict him because he was not at Walmart when the attack
occurred.

See Br. of Aplt. at 41-45.

Defendant's drinking buddy

and central alibi witness, David Gouge, presented a detailed
chronology of defendant's activities on the night of the assault
at Walmart (R. 139: 424-35, 443-447, 453).
testified to those events.

Defendant also

See id. at 506-74.

Certainly, had

the jury believed this testimony and disbelieved all of the
State's witnesses, it would have acquitted defendant.

The

verdict, however, clearly attests to the fact that it did not
find defendant or his associate credible, a decision that a
reviewing court will not revisit.

State v. Wright, 893 P.2d

1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1995).

7

Defendant did not object to the admission of this voice
identification testimony nor did he ask for a cautionary
instruction on it.
-14-

Finally, defendant argues without any legal authority that
the teenager's identification of defendant's license plate in the
Walmart parking lot is insufficient to establish that defendant
was the assailant.

See Br. of Aplt. at 41.

briefed argument is misguided.

This inadequately-

Not only did the teenager

identify defendant's license plate at Walmart, but defendant also
conceded that he was the only person with access to his truck,
bearing the same license number, that night.

These facts,

considered in conjunction with the testimony of the victim, the
power washer, and the officer who ultimately stopped defendant at
the bar, clearly provide sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict.
Where, as here, defendant's insufficiency claim "presumes
that the jury was obligated to believe the evidence most
favorable to defendant rather than that presented in opposition
by the State," his claim necessarily fails.

State v. Howell, 649

P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for one count of aggravated assault, a third degree
felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7

day of February, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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